Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is typically prevent with one of the following methods:
The static form ID provides no protection at all; an attacker can fetch it himself. Remember, the attacker is not constrained to using JavaScript on the client; he can fetch the static form ID server-side.
I'm not sure I entirely understand the proposed defense; where does the GET /usersecret/john_doe come from? Is that part of the page JavaScript? Is that the literal proposed URL? If so, I'm assuming that username is not a secret, which means that evil.ru can recover user secrets if a browser or plugin bug allows cross-domain GET requests. Why not store the user secret in a cookie upon authentication rather than let anyone who can do cross-domain GETs retrieve it?
I would read "Robust Defenses for Cross-Site Forgery" really carefully before I implemented my own authentication system that I wanted to be resistant to CSRF. In fact, I would reconsider implementing my own authentication system at all.