I have the following working NASM code:
global _start
section .text
_start:
mov eax, 0x4
mov ebx, 0x1
mov ecx, message
mov edx, 0xF
int
As BSH mentioned, your shellcode does not contain the message bytes. Jumping to the MESSAGE label and calling the GOBACK routine just before defining the msg byte was a good move as the address of msg would be on the top of the stack as return address which could be popped to ecx, where the address of msg is stored.
But both yours and BSH's code has a slight limitation.
It contains NULL bytes ( \x00 ) which would be considered as end of string when dereferenced by the function pointer.
There is a smart way around this. The values you store into eax, ebx and edx are small enough to be directly written into the lower nibbles of the respective registers in one go by accessing al, bl and dl respectively.
The upper nibble may contain junk value so it can be xored.
b8 04 00 00 00 ------ mov $0x4,%eax
becomes
b0 04 ------ mov $0x4,%al
31 c0 ------ xor %eax,%eax
Unlike the prior instruction set, the new instruction set does not contain any NULL byte.
So, the final program looks like this :
global _start
section .text
_start:
jmp message
proc:
xor eax, eax
mov al, 0x04
xor ebx, ebx
mov bl, 0x01
pop ecx
xor edx, edx
mov dl, 0x16
int 0x80
xor eax, eax
mov al, 0x01
xor ebx, ebx
mov bl, 0x01 ; return 1
int 0x80
message:
call proc
msg db " y0u sp34k 1337 ? "
section .data
Assembling and linking :
$ nasm -f elf hello.asm -o hello.o
$ ld -s -m elf_i386 hello.o -o hello
$ ./hello
y0u sp34k 1337 ? $
Now extract the shellcode from the hello binary :
$ for i in `objdump -d hello | tr '\t' ' ' | tr ' ' '\n' | egrep '^[0-9a-f]{2}$' ` ; do echo -n "\\x$i" ; done
output:
\xeb\x19\x31\xc0\xb0\x04\x31\xdb\xb3\x01\x59\x31\xd2\xb2\x12\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\xb0\x01\x31\xdb\xb3\x01\xcd\x80\xe8\xe2\xff\xff\xff\x20\x79\x30\x75\x20\x73\x70\x33\x34\x6b\x20\x31\x33\x33\x37\x20\x3f\x20
Now we can have our driver program to launch the shellcode.
#include
char shellcode[] = "\xeb\x19\x31\xc0\xb0\x04\x31\xdb"
"\xb3\x01\x59\x31\xd2\xb2\x12\xcd"
"\x80\x31\xc0\xb0\x01\x31\xdb\xb3"
"\x01\xcd\x80\xe8\xe2\xff\xff\xff"
"\x20\x79\x30\x75\x20\x73\x70\x33"
"\x34\x6b\x20\x31\x33\x33\x37\x20"
"\x3f\x20";
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
(*(void(*)())shellcode)();
return 0;
}
There are certain security features in modern compilers like NX protection which prevents execution of code in data segment or stack. So we should explicitly specify the compiler to disable these.
$ gcc -g -Wall -fno-stack-protector -z execstack launcher.c -o launcher
Now the launcher can be invoked to launch the shellcode.
$ ./launcher
y0u sp34k 1337 ? $
For more complex shellcodes, there would be another hurdle. Modern Linux kernels have ASLR or Address Space Layout Randomization
You may need to disable this before your inject the shellcode, especially when it is through buffer overflows.
root@localhost:~# echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space